The paper analyzes the eects of liberalization in increasing returns to scale industries. It studies the optimal regulation of an incumbent competing with an unregulated strategic competitor, when public funds are costly. The model shows a trade o between productive and allocative eciency. Moreover, the welfare gains of liberalization, as compared with regulated monopoly, are a non monotonic function of the cost of public funds. Finally, in the case of severe cash constraint of the government, incomplete regulation may also dominate full regulation of duopoly.
Introduction
Over the last 25 years many regulated markets have been reformed, both in developed and developing countries. Technological changes and the growing dissatisfaction with the performance of regulated monopolies led to the introduction of pro-competitive reforms. We refer to this process of market opening as to liberalization 1 and, in this context, the present paper studies the optimal regulation of an incumbent exposed to unregulated competition. This is particularly relevant in the contexts of regional integration such as the European Union, where the EC legislation prescribes progressive opening to competition of formerly regulated monopolies. Similarly, other regions promote market integration in regulated markets (examples are the experiences of energy market integration in Latin America, East-Asia, West and South Africa). An important feature of these markets is that, due to residual increasing returns to scale and incumbency advantage, they tend to remain concentrated and the national leaders stay dominant. For this reason, regulation is needed even after liberalization. Often this regulation is incomplete (or asymmetric) : the regulator directly inuences the operations of the incumbent, while competitors are less regulated (or unregulated) . This can arise for many reasons. In many cases the incumbent is subject to additional requirements to correct for the consequences of market power (this is common in both electricity and telecommunication markets) or because it is the universal service provider (universal service obligations are usually contracted with incumbent rms on a long term basis). In addition, incomplete regulation may emerge because regulators are not able to extend an eective regulatory control on large multinational rms (especially in developing countries). Finally, incomplete market regulation may depend on the fact that regulated rms are exposed to competition from unregulated producers adopting alternative technologies. For instance, trains and trucks compete in freight transportation and the truck industry is usually unregulated while railways are heavily regulated. Similarly, high speed railways compete on some routes with airlines (which are subject to lighter regulation). In telecommunications, the heavily regulated xed lines operators are increasingly exposed to competition from mobiles and internet services.
Several empirical studies have tried to measure the impact of increasing competition in regulated markets. Most of them agree that an increase in competition induces an increase in eciency (see for instance the cross-country analysis of Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000 for telecommunications, Pollit, 1995 for electricity, and the studies of Wilson, 1997 and Pollit and Smith, 2001 for railways in the US and UK respectively). The impact of competition on prices is by far less clear.
The results are mixed and debated. Hausman, Leonard, and Sidak (2002) analyzing the entry of the Bell Companies in the US long distance telecommunication market, nd that increased competition has been associated with a decrease of the per minute price but an increase in the monthly fee (with the net eect of reducing the annual bill of the average consumer). In the case of electricity, the empirical evidence does not support the idea the liberalization is associated with decreasing prices. There are some positive results (Steiner, 2001 ) and many negative (Green and Newbery in Helm and Jenkinson, 1998 , Domah and Pollit, 2001 , Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatrick, 2002 , Hattori and Tsutsui, 2003 . Summarizing, pro competitive reforms increase eciency but do not necessary translate into lower prices. The broad welfare consequences of these reforms are easy to understand.
1 In contrast, the reforms involving a change of ownership are referred to as privatization. The question of ownership, which has been widely studied in the literature, is not explicitly considered here. For surveys of the theoretical and empirical contributions on the topic, see for instance Shleifer (1998) and Meggison and Netter (2001) .
In what follows we study the eects of liberalization in an incomplete regulation framework. The regulator controls the production of the regulated rm and sets a regulatory instrument (tax or transfer), but public funds are costly. In this context, the shadow cost of public funds plays an important role, because it is related to the weight put on the incumbent's prot in the social welfare function. Indeed, the chosen modeling strategy is a way to capture in a reduced form the idea that the operating prots of the regulated incumbent are socially valuable, because they help to reduce distortive taxation.
2 Consistent with the empirical evidence, we nd that the introduction of competition does not always decrease prices. More precisely, we identify a trade o between productive and allocative eciency. When asymmetric information is added to the picture, the presence of an unregulated competitor has an additional value because it helps to reduce the information rent captured by the regulated rm: we explore this possibility introducing yardstick competition. The theoretical benets of yardstick competition have been analyzed in the literature starting with the work of Shleifer (1985) . In recent years, regulators have started applying several form of benchmarking, inspired by this theoretical literature. For instance, yardstick competition have been applied to hospital regulation in many countries, following the example of the American Medicare system. Moreover, yardstick competition has been used for regulating buses in Norway and water utilities in the UK. Our model shows how the presence of unregulated competitors may help to regulate regulated producers. Although this has not received a lot of attention, some evidence of this possibility has been documented empirically in Bhaskar, Gupta, and Khan (2006) , analyzing the yardstick eect of partial privatization of the Bangladesh jute sector.
Introducing yardstick competition in an incomplete regulation framework, we show a nonmonotonic relationship between the welfare gains of liberalization and the cost of public funds.
We also show that these welfare gains are robust and do not depend crucially on the chosen market structure. In particular, under asymmetric information, partial regulation may dominate full regulation of duopoly. This occurs in case of severe cash constraint of the government.
1.1
Relationship with the literature
The virtues of the two pure models of monopoly regulation and perfect competition are well understood. However, the conditions under which regulated supply is preferable to unregulated competition in concentrated markets are less clear (see Armstrong and Sappington, 2006) . In particular, as Armstrong and Sappington (2005) observe, unfettered competition can complicate regulatory policy by undermining preferred pricing structures (i.e. taxation by regulation). The public nance aspect of deregulation is analyzed in Auriol and Picard (2007) , who compare full regulation of monopoly to full privatization (which is equivalent to laissez-faire in their context). They show how the public budget conditions of countries can inuence the optimal privatization policy. Our paper shows that the scal aspect of monopoly regulation matters not only when considering privatization, but also liberalization. Other works have introduced competition in regulated markets, often adapting the classical regulation model of Baron and Myerson (1982) . One possible approach is to assume that the entire industry is regulated, like 2 For simplicity, you can think of the revenue of a public or mixed incumbent. However model is also consistent with the imposition of taxes on the rents made by private rms. Indeed, incumbents are often vertically and/or horizontally integrated with rms operating in non-competitive segments and their operating prots may help to cross subsidize non-competitive activities (e.g. infrastructure investment and universal service obligations). A reduction of the incumbent's prot may thus undermine taxation by regulation. More in general, governments can can tax more easily domestic rms than foreign ones. Rents extraction does not apply to the same extent to domestic and foreign rms because the latter do not report most of their prots locally.
in the duopoly model of Auriol and Laont (1993) . Closer to the kind of situation we have in mind (regulated rm vs unregulated competitors), Laont and Tirole (1993) look at the case of a multi-product regulated monopoly exposed to a competitive fringe. They show that, when competition is responsible for an increase in variety, the optimal pricing rule can be higher than the monopoly Ramsey benchmark.
3 De Fraja (1997) extends the analysis to the case in which the unregulated competitor has an (unknown) entry cost, with similar results on this point. Caillaud (1990) considers competition between a dominant regulated rm and an unregulated fringe under asymmetric information and cost correlation. He shows that competition has a positive eect on overall eciency and helps to reduce the rent of the regulated rm. However, the welfare maximizing behavior of the regulator produces a non-standard optimization problem, which admits a complete characterization only in the limiting cases of perfect correlation and full independence of marginal costs.
4
In the present paper, we introduce yardstick competition, using a stochastic structure inspired by Auriol and Laont (1993) . This allows to study in a tractable way the impact of an unregulated competition on prices and welfare in the realistic case of partial cost correlation.
Most of existing literature considers a non-strategic competitive fringe. However, this assumption does not t particularly well oligopolistic industries. One noticeable exception is the work of Biglaiser and Ma (1995) , who build a model of horizontal and vertical dierentiation, in which consumers have an exogenous preference for the variety produced by the monopolist. They nd that competition helps to extract the rent of the regulated rm, but allocative ineciency arises in equilibrium. In the present paper, we consider both the impact of competition on productive and allocative eciency, when rms have asymmetric information about their production cost.
We also introduce a shadow cost of public funds, which allows to study the eect of competition on taxpayers.
In a similar framework, Aubert and Pouyet (2004, 2006) consider the possibility of collusion in an incomplete regulation framework. They show that in some cases the regulator might not be willing to ght collusive agreements.
5 Collusion and the optimal enforcement of competition policy are out of the scope of the present paper. We concentrate instead on the broad welfare consequences of the trade o between the loss of control on part of the industry and the eciency enhancing value of competition. We refer to their work for antitrust issues and related distortions, which would not change the main insights of our paper (see discussions in Sections 4 and 5).
Our results are also reminiscent of the literature on mixed markets (Beato and Mas-Colell, 1984 , Vickers and Yarrow, 1988 , Cremer, Marchand, and Thisse, 1989 , 1991 , De Fraja and Delbono, 1989 . These papers look at markets with public and private participants. In particular, Cremer, Marchand and Thisse argue that a mixed market can be preferred to both full privatization and full nationalization. This depends on the assumption that public rms are pure welfare 3 In an oligopolistic context, this eect does not crucially depend on the presence of partial substitution. It also arises in our model, though we do not make the assumption that competition is responsible for an increase in variety. Indeed, if it was the case, it should be explained why the monopoly did not produced more varieties in the rst place. We show that in an oligopolistic context an increase in the Ramsey markup can come from a rather dierent source: the trade o between productive and allocative eciency.
4 Similarly, Boyer and Laont (2003) , analyzing the eect of competition on the power of incentives in a regulated industry, limit their analysis to the case of independence of marginal costs, even though in regulated industries the costs of the dierent operators are generally correlated.
5 Instead, Tangeras (2002) introduces collusion under yardstick competition in a complete regulation framework à la Auriol and Laont (1993) . He shows that collusion arises only if rms can commit to side payments. In this case, the collusion proof contract introduces an additional distortion which partly reduces the benets of yardstick competition.
maximizers, but have the disadvantage of paying an exogenous wage premium to workers. In our framework, this exogenous cost disadvantage is replaced by the endogenous rent seeking behavior of the regulated rm, which makes regulation socially onerous.
Plan of the paper
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is presented. Section 3 and 4 treat the cases of symmetric and asymmetric information respectively. Optimal price, quantities and market structure are described. For performing comparative statics, the solution is fully characterized for the case of linear demand and uniform distribution. Section 5 presents the welfare analysis, comparing regulated monopoly to liberalization. Section 6 considers the issue of excess entry. Section 7 compares incomplete regulation to full duopoly regulation. Section 8
concludes.
The model
There are two rms, identied by 1 and 2. Firm 1 denotes the incumbent. Its quantity is determined by a regulator 6 , who also sets a regulatory instrument τ (tax or transfer). Firm 2, the entrant, is a fully unregulated private competitor. As such, it takes full accountability of its prots and losses. For simplicity, one can think of the case in which the national rm is public or mixed. Even in the case of privatized rms, asymmetric regulation is a relevant framework in many liberalized market, as explained in Section 1.
The regulator acts as a Stackelgerg leader through the quantity produced by Firm 1. Firm 2 is a Stackelberg follower. It maximizes prot choosing quantity q 2 after q 1 is determined. 7 The cost functions of the two rms take the form:
where the index i ∈ {1, 2} indicates the two rms, θ i is the constant marginal cost of rm i and k the xed cost. 8 Marginal costs θ i are common knowledge in the symmetric information case and private information of the rms in the asymmetric information one. We assume that the xed cost k has to be spent before θ 1 and θ 2 are discovered. The prots of the two rms write:
One may argue that it is much more common to regulate prices than quantities. Indeed, quantity competition allows to concentrate on the direct impact of competition in concentrated market, without incurring in Bertrandtype paradoxes. However, a model of price competition with closely substitute goods would deliver the same qualitative predictions, especially concerning the welfare impact of liberalization.
7 One important simplication of this model is that vertical issues (control of bottleneck facilities by the incumbent) are neglected. This can represent the case in which the entrant can bypass the infrastructure of the incumbent. Alternatively, one can think of industries in which there is vertical unbundling (or at least formal separation) and access is priced at marginal cost.
8 We could assume that the xed costs are dierent between rms. In this case, the cost of the competitor would explicitly represent the level of duplication of xed costs and possibly include and entry cost. This would not alter the nature of the results.
τ represents the regulatory instrument. It is a tax on prot when positive and a transfer when negative. r 2 (q 1 ) is the reaction function of rm 2, i.e. r 2 (q 1 ) = argmax q 2 Π 2 . We assume that public funds have a positive opportunity cost, namely λ, deriving, for example, from the need to raise taxes through distortive taxation. On the contrary. The prot of Firm 2 cannot be taxed away.
9 The social welfare function takes the form:
where S(Q) is gross consumer welfare and Q = q 1 + q 2 is the total quantity. The denition given in Equation (1) implies that the prots of both rms enter the social welfare function.
This would be the case if we consider two national rms. Alternatively, we can think of a foreign rm which participation brings some welfare gains to the host country (for instance because it creates employment). This specication has the advantage of allowing easy comparisons of our results with the existing literature on liberalization. However it is not crucial for the nature of the results. An alternative version of the model without the prot of Firm 2 in the social welfare function gives the same qualitative results.
We start considering the case in which both rms have entered the market. The decision of entry is studied in more detail in Section 6.
Symmetric information
In the benchmark case of symmetric information, the regulator observes both the variable costs θ 1 and θ 2 . The regulator maximizes social welfare (1) with respect to q 1 and τ , under the participation constraint of the regulated rm and the reaction function of the competitor.
10 The participation constraint takes the form:
This constraint is binding at optimum and the social welfare can be written:
Equation (3) makes it apparent how the existence of a cost of public funds puts a higher weight on the operating prot of Firm 1. The regulator maximizes (3) with respect to q 1 under the constraints:
9 This is a simplication to describe the empirically relevant case where national rms are more easily taxed than foreign competitors.
10 As in the mixed market framework, the regulator uses its control on the regulated rm to maximize welfare.
However, contrarily to the mixed market case, we do not assume a hard budget constraint between the regulated rm and the government (i.e. average cost pricing). When λ is positive, the operating prot of the rm can help to reduce distortive taxation and increase economy welfare.
Constraint (4) states that the competitor follows a (Cournot) best response function. Constraints (5) and (6) are the non-negativity constraints on the produced quantities. For solving the regulator's problem, we make the following Assumption:
Assumption 1 W SI is a continuous twice dierentiable function of q 1 . The second order condition ∂ 2 W SI /∂q 2 1 ≤ 0 is satised and the regulator's problem is concave. 11
) the regulated monopoly price under asymmetric information (Ramsey benchmark) and P (q M 2 ) the private monopoly price charged by Firm 2 when Firm 1 does not produce. We denote ε the elasticity of demand (ε ≡ −
∂Q ∂P P Q
). The solution of the regulator's program is characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Let q S 1 be such that
Under Assumption 1, the price under symmetric information is given by:
. where:
Proof See Appendix 1.
Price and market structure depend on the level of θ 2 , and more precisely on relative eciency of the competitor with respect to the incumbent. They change in the dierent sub-regions (namely M, M1, D and M2). We now discuss the characteristics of the dierent regions.
Region M:
In the region denoted by M , the price is equal to the one which would be chosen the in case of regulated monopoly. Firm 2 does not produce and there is a monopoly with Firm 1 even if Firm 2 is allowed to produce. In this case, removing barriers to entry does not change the market outcome. The potential entrant turns out to be too inecient to participate.
Region M1:
In region M 1, the price is equal to θ 2 . We are in a region in which Firm 2 would produce if the price was equal to P (q M 1 ) but does not do it under duopoly pricing. In this region, the pricing rule keeps out the competitor. This limit pricing behavior diers from other results in the literature, which emphasize the risk of predation by a regulated incumbent.
12 In our case, 11 It can be easily veried this assumption always hold if the demand function is concave and the reaction function of rm 2 has the standard Cournot-Stackelberg properties.
12 For instance, Faure-Grimaud (1997) , considering a regulated rm, shows that, in a dynamic framework, the rent of the regulated rm decreases with the number of competitors. For this reason a regulated rm has an incentive to foreclose rivals. Similarly, Sappington and Sidak (1994) , considering the particular case of state owned enterprizes, argue that the anticompetitive behavior can be reinforced with respect to the case of private prot maximizers.
the outcome depends on the behavior of the regulator, which acts as a pure welfare maximizer.
Notice that this region exists only when λ > 0. 13 In this case, the regulated monopoly price would be higher than marginal cost pricing. The price reduction under duopoly aims then to discourage inecient entry.
Region D:
In Region D both rms are active: the market is a true duopoly. In this case, the price is given by a modied Ramsey rule. It is easy to verify that the price is always higher than the marginal cost of Firm 1, because both the second and the third term in the price formula are positive. The second term corresponds to the usual Ramsey term, but it is here multiplied by the elasticity of the total quantity to the quantity produced by Firm 1 (i.e.
1 + r 2 (q 1 )
Ramsey term is thus reduced with respect to the traditional regulated monopoly case. The third term is an additional term which is positive for all prices such that the second rm produces a positive quantity (i.e. P (Q) ≥ θ 2 ). This term increases the Lerner index with respect to the regulated monopoly case. When the quantity produced by Firm 1 is reduced to leave space to the more ecient competitor, the increase in the quantity produced by the latter is small.
This terms captures the trade o between producing at lower cost (i.e. letting a greater market share to an oligopolistic rm) and reducing the price. This eect is described more formally in Proposition 2.
Region M2:
The last region to consider is the one denoted M 2, where the optimal quantity produced by
Firm is equal to zero. In this case, Firm 2 produces its monopoly quantity and it is the only rm on the market. The regulator prefers to shut down the regulated rm and let the private competitor take over.
Linear demand
We now take a linear specication of the demand function, which allows to explicitly compute the price and quantities and to compare them with the regulated monopoly ones.
Assumption 2 The (inverse) demand function is P (Q) = 1 − Q.
The linear demand function is associated with a consumer surplus of the form: S(Q) = Q − Q 2 /2. In this case, the reaction function of Firm 2 is given by:
Under Assumption 2, the quantities and price can be expressed as a function of the marginal costs and λ (see Appendix 1 for details). This allows to explicitly compare the duopoly quantities and price with the ones obtained under regulated monopoly. Developing computations, we obtain the following result, which illustrates the trade o described in the discussion following Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Let Q D,SI be the duopoly quantity produced for θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ D. Under Assumption 2 the following holds:
corresponds to the marginal cost θ1. Then region M1 would be such that P (q •
if and only if:
For the empirically more relevant case (λ ≤ 1) 14 , there is a trade o between productive and allocative eciency. A price decrease does not depend on the fact that the relative eciency of the entrant is large (i.e. θ 2 θ 1 ), but it tends to occur when Firm 2 is not too ecient. In this case, the regulator expands the quantity produced by Firm 1 in order to reduce the scale of entry of the unregulated rm. This increases the total quantity and reduces the price. On the contrary, a decrease in the average cost of production is not systematically transmitted to the price. When Firm 2 is relatively ecient, the price tends to increase with respect to monopoly, because the reduction in the quantity produced by the regulated rm is not fully compensated by the production of Firm 2.
Asymmetric information
We now turn to the case of asymmetric information. We assume that production costs are private information of the rms, but their distribution is common knowledge. Under asymmetric information, the regulator has to leave a rent to the regulated rm to extract the information about the realization of the marginal cost. However, the regulator observes the market nal price and/or quantity. This gives some information about the level of θ 2 (and thus, in the presence of correlation, about θ 1 ). The regulator can use this information to perform yardstick competition.
As Crémer and Mc Lean (1988) show, under some conditions partial correlation can be sucient to allow a principal to fully extract the surplus in an asymmetric information problem. However, it seems reasonable to assume that in practice yardstick competition reduces the agency cost of asymmetric information without making it vanish. To convey this idea, we take a specication which is inspired by Auriol and Laont (1993) . We assume that the marginal costs of the two rms have the shape θ i = β + ε i , where β is the common part of marginal costs and ε i is an idiosyncratic shock with zero mean. The correlation between the costs of the two rms is captured by the common parameter β, which represents the average cost in the industry, that is E(θ i ) = β. Firms sustain some common production cost (e.g. same cost of inputs, similar technologies), but they are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which determine the relative eciency of the dierent providers. This specication does not respect the assumption of the Crémer and Mc Lean (1988) theorem and the full extraction property does not hold. However, contrarily to more general specications (see Caillaud, 1990 on this point), it allows to capture in a tractable way the impact of imperfect cost correlation. For the analytical solution of the model, we thus precise this stochastic structure as follows:
Assumption 3 Let the marginal cost be of the form θ i = β + ε i . β is a discrete random variable which takes values β or β with Prob(β = β) = ν. ε is a continuous variable with distribution on the support [ε, ε] . Moreover,
This specication is simply a way to assume that the marginal costs are both distributed either on the support Z 1 = [θ, z] or on Z 2 = [z, θ], with θ < z < θ. It is never the case that θ i ∈ Z 1 and θ j ∈ Z 2 , i = j (either the two costs are low or they are both high). For simplicity, we assume that the two possible intervals do not overlap.
The contract is now contingent on the realization of q 2 . Since the competitor is a Stackelberg follower, its quantity is observed after Firm 1 produces q 1 . We assume that the regulator is able to commit to punish the manager of Firm 1 after q 2 has been observed, in case the deduced θ 2 is inconsistent with the report on θ 1 . This notion of punishment has not to be confused with the fact that the rationality constraint of the rm is always satised (Firm 1 never makes accidental losses). This does not exclude that managers can be persecuted and/or replaced for fraudulent behavior. We consider a direct revelation mechanism in which Firm 1 reports its cost and the regulator oers a menu of contracts [q 1 (θ 1 ), τ (θ 1 , q 2 )] for each possible type θ 1 (the revelation principle ensures that there is no loss of generality in restricting the attention to direct revelation mechanisms). With the stochastic structure described in Assumption 3, ∂F (θ 2 |θ 1 )/∂θ 1 is zero almost everywhere (i.e. except if θ 1 = z). A marginal variation of θ 1 does not change Firm's 1 conditional expectation on Firm's 2 characteristic (except in one case which occurs with probability zero). We denote Π(θ 1 ) = E θ 2 |θ 1 Π 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ) the expected prot of Firm 1. Yardstick competition ensures that the rent is paid only on the relevant interval of θ 1 and types θ 1 = 1 and θ 1 = z get zero rent. 15 The information rent can be computed following the by now standard technique (see for instance Laont and Martimort, 2002) . When β = β (i.e. θ 1 ∈ Z 2 ), we have:
We thus obtain:
where I Z 2 is the indicator function of θ 1 falling in region Z 2 , which means:
From Equation (9), we see that the slope is reduced with respect to the monopoly case in which the rent is proportional to the full hazard rate:
16 15 This rent reducing eect on the rent is dierent with respect to the correlation eect studied in Caillaud (1990) and afterwards in the literature on strategic trade policy (see Brainard and Martimort, 1996 and Combes, Caillaud, and Jullien, 1997 . In all these cases, the rent seeking behavior of the regulated rm is modied by competition through the term ∂F (θ2|θ1)/∂θ1. In our case ∂F (θ2|θ1)/∂θ1 = 0 almost everywhere, but the yardstick eect cuts down the rent of the regulated rm. Our specication avoids technical diculties and allows to characterize the eect of partial correlation on the optimal contract, relying on the realistic hypothesis that yardstick competition is used to reduce the agency cost of asymmetric information.
16 In the case of shut down of Firm 2, the regulator cannot deduce the exact value of θ2. Nevertheless, this does not need to aect the capability of the regulator to reduce the rent of Firm 1. It is sucient to assume that,
We make the following standard assumption:
Assumption 4 The hazard rate F (θ 1 )/f (θ 1 ) is non-decreasing for all θ 1 .
The regulator chooses q 1 without observing θ 2 , maximizing expected welfare. Replacing for the value of the rent (in order to satisfy the incentive constraint of truthful revelation), we have:
The solution of the problem gives a rule on the expected price, which is characterized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Let q A 1 be such that
Under Assumption 1 and 4, in the case of asymmetric information the pricing rule is given by:
where:
and θ v 1 is the virtual cost including the distortion related to the information rent:
. Proof See Appendix 2.
As in the case of symmetric information, the quantities and price are dierent in dierent regions, depending on cost realizations.
Region M1 ∪ D:
In this region Firm 1 produces a positive quantity. Because the θ 2 is not observed, the quantity produced by rm 1 is set maximizing expected welfare, while the realized market structure depends on the realization of θ 2 . There can be a monopoly with rm 1 if q 2 = 0 (region M1) or a duopoly (region D). In region D the pricing rule has the same form as in Proposition 1, except that it is a rule on the expected price. Moreover, the cost θ 1 is replaced by the virtual cost θ v 1 .
Region M2:
In region M 2, the quantity produced by Firm 1 is equal to zero. In this case, Firm 2 produces its monopoly quantity and the price.
whenever the regulated rm is lying across intervals, Firm 2 produces a positive quantity, revealing the relevant subinterval of the variable costs. For instance, one can easily show that this always holds under Assumptions 2 and 5. At the optimal menu of contracts, q2(q1|θ1 ∈ Z1,θ1 ∈ Z2) > 0, ∀θ1, θ2 ∈ Z1.
Linear demand
As in Section 3.1, we now completely characterize the solution for the case of linear demand in Assumption 2. Moreover, we precise the stochastic structure of Assumption 3 as follows:
Assumption 5 Let Assumption 3 hold and:
In this case, θ i is uniformly distributed either on Z 1 = [0, 
Under Assumption 2 and 5, the regions implicitly characterized in Proposition 3 can be explicitly expressed in terms of the eciency parameters θ 1 and θ 2 . They are illustrated in However, because of yardstick competition, the price is closer to eciency. The virtual cost of production is smaller than in the case of regulated monopoly, i.e. θ 1 + λ 1+λ
. For this reason, the price decreases more often than in the case of complete 17 The gure is plotted for λ = 0.3, but the same qualitative shape is obtained for all λ > 0.
information. Yardstick competition, increasing the productive eciency of the regulated rm, allows to increase the produced quantity at a lower cost. Observing the market behavior of an unregulated rm provides precious information to the regulator, since this behavior is not distorted by regulation.
18
One may also note that, because θ 2 is not observable, the shut down rule for Firm 1 depends now only on θ 1 . There can hence be a monopoly with Firm 2 for each level of θ 2 (Region M2). This region of the parameters includes the one in which there would be shut down under monopoly (and no production in the absence of Firm 2). In this case, a competitor with market power is valuable with respect to the alternative of not providing the service at all.
Welfare analysis
In this section, we compare expected welfare under regulated monopoly and partially regulated duopoly. First of all, we note that, when λ → 0, transfers are not costly and entry is accomodated only when it is benecial (i.e. when the competitor is more ecient than the entrant). The expected welfare under duopoly (net of xed costs) would then be larger than under monopoly.
On the contrary, when λ → ∞, only the prot of the regulated rm matters. Since the monopoly prot is always larger than the Stackelberg one, the welfare gains associated with competition go to −∞ when λ → ∞. 
Symmetric information:
We denote q D,SI i the duopoly quantity produced under symmetric information by Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2} and Q D,SI the total quantity. Under Assumption 2, expected welfare under monopoly and duopoly is respectively:
We deduce that under symmetric information, duopoly is preferred to monopoly whenever
This determines a threshold value of k, characterized by the following Proposition.
18 Naturally, this also depends on the fact that we rule out the possibility of collusion between the incumbent and the entrant. Aubert and Pouyet (2006) show that in a incomplete regulation framework, collusion (with transfers) could be preferred to a collusion proof contract, because it allows the regulator and the incumbent to team up and tax or subsidize the entrant. The possibility of extracting a collusive transfer from the entrant could reduce the negative impact of business stealing. On the other hand, if rms collude, the eectiveness of yardstick competition might be reduced (see also Pouyet, 2002) . Qualitatively, the main insights of our paper would carry on.
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 2 and 5 hold. In the case of symmetric information, we have two cases:
1. For λ ≤ 1.1, there exists a threshold k SI such that liberalization dominates partially regulated monopoly for k ≤ k SI . Moreover, k SI increases in a small neighborhood of λ = 0. Afterwards, it is decreasing.
2. For λ > 1.1 regulated monopoly always dominates partially regulated monopoly.
Proof See Appendix 3.
When λ increases, the prot of the regulated rm becomes valuable and the business stealing eect starts making entry less desirable.
19 When λ is high (λ > 1.1), a regulated monopoly is preferred to liberalization for all levels of the increasing returns to scale (this range of λ can describe severely constrained governments, such as the ones of many developing countries).
For lower values, the desirability of incomplete regulation, as compared to monopoly, generally decreases with the value of λ (except in a small neighborhood of zero, λ ≤ 0.0001). The results of this section are in line with the common view that competition can be welfare increasing if the economies of scale are not very large. However, we have shown that there is another important condition: the cost of public funds has to be not too large either. For the same level of economies of scales, countries with dierent cost of public funds would optimally choose dierent industrial policies. The threshold k SI is plotted in Figure 2 (dotted line).
Asymmetric information:
We denote q D,AI i the duopoly quantity produced under asymmetric information by Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2} and Q D,AI the total quantity. Under Assumptions 2 and 5, expected welfare under monopoly and duopoly is respectively:
Under asymmetric information, duopoly is preferred to monopoly whenever W D,AI −W M,AI ≥ 0. This determines a threshold value of k, characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 2 and 5 hold. In the case of asymmetric information, we have two cases:
1. For λ ≤ 3.7, there exists a threshold k AI such that partially regulated duopoly dominates regulated monopoly for k ≤ k AI ; The threshold k AI has an inverse U-shape.
2. For λ > 3.7 regulated monopoly always dominates partially regulated duopoly.
In the case of asymmetric information, regulated monopoly always (i.e. independently on the level of economies of scale) dominates incomplete regulation only if λ is very large (values larger than 3 are usually considered not empirically relevant). For lower values, the threshold k AI has an inverse U shape. In Figure 2 , k AI (solid line) is compared with k SI (dotted line). 
For any value of λ signicatively dierent from 0 (more precisely, λ ≥ 0.05) 20 , partial regulation is preferred to monopoly for higher values of k than in the case of symmetric information. In other words, for λ ≥ 0.05 asymmetric information favors duopoly. Once again, dierent countries have dierent optimal industry structure, for the same level of increasing returns to scale. For instance, in our specication, if k 0.03, countries with low cost of public funds prefer keeping a statutory monopoly, for intermediate values the duopoly structure is preferred and nally for very large values of λ the monopoly structure is again optimal.
Naturally, the precise shape of the curves depends on the assumption made on the support of the distribution of marginal costs. We have assumed that marginal costs are distributed on symmetric subintervals of the interval [0, 1] . This maximizes ex-ante technological uncertainty 21 and, 20 When λ = 0, the rent left to the rm does not aect the expected welfare. In this case, the only dierence between the problem under symmetric and asymmetric information is in the fact that under asymmetric information the regulator cannot observe θ2 (and chooses on the base of an expectation). If θ2 was either observable or unobservable in both cases (which means that the symmetric/asymmetric information would then only be about the cost of the regulated rm), the two curves would cross in λ = 0.
21 The intercept of the demand function is also equal to 1. Then θ = 1 is the maximum value that makes production desirable in a complete information benchmark.
consequently, the potential gains from yardstick competition (as Equation (10) shows, the rent reduction depends the support of marginal costs). If the variance of marginal cost was smaller, the dierence between the two thresholds k SI and k AI would be reduced, but their qualitative shape would not be aected.
6 Excess entry:
Until now, we have supposed that both rms have invested k and entered the market. Indeed, the regulatory contract satises the ex post participation constraint of Firm 1. Then, Firm 1 is always in the market. We now consider the entry decision of Firm 2. To participate, Firm 2 has to spend k before knowing the realization of the variable costs. We denote k SI 2 and k AI 2 the thresholds of k below which Firm 2 nds privately protable to enter the market under symmetric and asymmetric information respectively. They are given by the value of the xed cost below which the expected prot is non negative. We compare these thresholds with k SI and k AI . The results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 2 and 5, the level of xed costs under which Firm 2 nds privately protable to enter the market is higher than the level below which entry is socially valuable. Excess entry occurs, both under symmetric and asymmetric information.
The results are represented in Figure 3 . The shaded regions correspond to values of the parameters for which excess entry occurs.
Excess entry depends on the fact that Firm 2 does not internalize the impact of entry on the operating prot of Firm 1 (and on taxpayers). Thus, there are cases in which the regulator is willing to control entry. It can be formally shown that the problem is less severe in the case of asymmetric information, as the graph qualitatively shows. In the case of asymmetric information, the perceived production cost is the virtual cost (which is lower in the case of duopoly, because of yardstick competition). Then, eciency gains are larger and the divergence of private and social gains from entry is less pronounced.
Incomplete vs full regulation
Insofar, we have analyzed a partially regulated market, ruling out the possibility that all rms in the market are subject to the same regulatory scheme. One could think that, at least from a theoretical point of view, full regulation of the market, when feasible, would always be preferable to incomplete regulation, unless extending the scope of regulation is costly for some exogenous reason. It turns out that the welfare gains of liberalization under partial regulation are quite
robust. In what follows, we compare welfare under incomplete regulation with welfare in the case of full regulation of duopoly. As a full regulation benchmark, we use the model of Auriol and Laont (1993) . In their model, the quantities of both rms are regulated and subject to a lump sum tax/tranfer. Then, the prot of Firm i can be written as: In our notation, the regulator's problem is to maximize welfare with respect to q 1 , q 2 , τ 1 , τ 2 :
Since variable costs are linear, at the optimum only the most ecient rm produces and the pricing rule is given by the traditional regulated monopoly Ramsey pricing. Due to yardstick competition, under asymmetric information the virtual cost is the same as in Proposition 3 (for further details, see Auriol and Laont, 1993) . Then the pricing rule satises:
Under symmetric information, full regulation always dominates incomplete regulation. The intuition is very natural. The regulator commits to cover the xed costs of both rms, but at the same time she can extract their full operating prot. As a result, she can at least replicate the results of an unregulated rm. Under asymmetric information, the situation is more complex.
Regulated rms are able to get some information rent and the relevant production cost for the regulator is the virtual cost θ v i ≥ θ i . Because of this distortion, the regulator cannot extract the full operating prot. Under full regulation, she induces production at the distorted virtual cost, while covering both xed costs. On the contrary, under incomplete regulation the unregulated competitor gets full accountability for its prots/losses. When λ is high, the agency cost of regulation may overweight its benets. In this case, there exists a threshold value of λ above which incomplete regulation dominates full regulation of duopoly. The result is stated formally in the following proposition for the case of linear demand.
Proposition 7 Let Assumption 2 and 5 hold. Then, in the case of asymmetric information, partial regulation dominates full duopoly regulation when λ and k are suciently large.
Proof See Appendix 3. Figure 4 the solid line represents dierence between welfare under incomplete and full regulation when k = k AI 2 , which is the maximum value of xed costs that a private rm is willing to pay (i.e. the maximum value under which a second rm exists). When k = k AI 2 the savings related to not committing to cover the xed costs of Firm 2 are maximal. However, the same result could be obtained for any value of k introducing an ex-ante xed fee for the unregulated competitor (licence fee). The model shows that incomplete regulation can be an interesting option for governments limited by severe cash constraint. In fact, this conciliates the benets of keeping some regulated provision with the advantages of private participation.
Conclusion
The paper discusses the impact of opening a regulated monopoly to unregulated competition. It is a model of liberalization with incomplete regulation: the regulator contracts with the incumbent, but can only indirectly inuence the behavior of the competitor. We have shown a trade o between encouraging the production of a relatively ecient competitor (increasing productive eciency) and the market power of this competitor (which leads to allocative ineciency). We show that entry can be associated to an increase in the price when the entrant is more ecient than the incumbent. An increase in eciency is generally associated with an increase in the price and prots, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The desirability of introducing this kind of competition is thus sensible to the weight the regulator puts on consumer surplus. The cost public funds, determining the weight put on the incumbent's operating prots, is shown to play an important role in the welfare analysis. In particular, the welfare gains of liberalization do not only depend on the degree of increasing returns to scale (measured by the xed costs), but also on the magnitude of the cost of public funds. The relationship between the cost of public funds and the welfare gains associated to liberalization is non-monotone. For the same level of increasing returns to scales, dierent countries can have dierent optimal industry structures. The problem is given in 3. When the non-negativity constraints (5) and (6) are not binding, the solution is given by the rst order condition ∂W SI ∂q 1 = 0. Rearranging this condition we obtain the pricing rule associated with region D (no shut down case). If the non-negative constraint (5) is binding, then q 1 = 0 and rm 2 acts as a monopoly. Then, by denition, rm 2 produces its monopoly quantity dened as q M 2 , which induces a price equal P (q M 2 ) (region M2). If the non-negative constraint (6) is binding, there is a monopoly with rm 1. There are two dierent cases. If P (q M 1 ) < θ 2 , then r 2 (q M 1 ) = 0 and ∂r 2 (q 1 ) ∂q 1 q 1 =q M 1 = 0. Then, the second best solution is equivalent to the case of regulated monopoly, namely q M 1 associated with price P (q M 1 ) (region M). If P (q M 1 ) ≥ θ 2 , ∂r 2 /∂q 1 > 0 and (6) can be binding if and only if P (Q) = θ 2 (region M1).
Linear Demand:
Replacing S(Q) = Q − From these expressions we obtain the results in Proposition 2.
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
The regulator maximizes the expected welfare (11), taking into account (10) and (4) The solution is obtained by the rst order condition with respect to q 1 , when this gives a positive quantity (i.e. q 1 ≥ 0 not binding). If q 1 = 0, the expected price is given by the expected monopoly price of the competitor. This characterization of the expected price is summarized in Proposition 3.
We now consider the case of linear demand and θ i distributed as in Assumption 4. In this case:
The rst order condition gives:
q 1 = (−1 − 4λ + 2 10 + 38λ + 37λ 2 − 12θ 1 (1 + 2λ) 2 6(1 + 2λ)
Checking for the second order condition an controlling for the fact that any quantity has to belong to the interval The thresholds k SI , k AI , k SI 2 , k AI 2 and the threshold value of Proposition 7 are obtained as analytical functions of λ integrating above these intervals of realizations of θ 1 and θ 2 . The study of the behavior of these functions gives all the results described in Proposition 4-7 (more details are available on request).
